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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND EARNINGS REPORTING 
Mary F. Calegari, San Jose State University 
Tospom Chotigeat, Nicholls State University 
Maretno A. Harjoto, Pepperdine University 
Despite increasing interests on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities among managers, the 
relationship between CSR and firm value through earnings reporting quality is still unclear. Absence of a strong 
positive effect of CSR on firm value has led researchers to believe that CSR is a res ult of a principal-agent issue 
between shareholders and managers. This study argues CSR represents a corporate culture that influences how a 
corporation reports its earnings. CSR influ ences earnings reporting ·instead ofearnings reporting drives CSR to delude 
shareholders. CSR induces better earnings reporting quality, therefore, CSR has an indirect but positive effect on firm 
value 
Introduction 
The unprecedented _corporate scandals such as Enron, Global Crossing and Worldcom in recent years have 
amplified the awareness among the busin ess community that maintaining a company' s public image and reputation is a 
critical element of smvival and success for corporations across the globe. Business leaders began to embrace soc ial 
activities that are considered important to their stakeholders instead of focu sing only on their shareholders. Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) has become a buzzword among top managers. While managers are giving more careful 
thought to CSR, most of them are still unclear of what to accomplish and how to define CSR activities in their · 
companies. 
A recent report by the Economist Intelligence Unit of the Global Business Barometer, based on a survey of I, 192 
global executives, shows that CSR is taking a proper account of the broader interests of society beyond that of the 
shareholders when making business decisions and the trends of corporate social responsibility are as follows 
(Economist, January 17, 2008): 
1. 	 Degree of high priority given to corporate social responsibility has been increas ing, ranging from 34% three 
years ago, 56% today, and 69% three years hence . 
2. 	 Slightly over 53% agree that corporate social responsibility is a necessary cost of doing business. 
3 . 	 Slightly over 53% agree that corporate social responsibility gives us a distinctive position in the market . 
4. 	 About 22.6% agree that corporate social responsibility is meaningless if it includes things that companies 
would do anyway. 
5. About 3.8% agree that corporate social responsibility is a waste of time and money. 
Although CSR has obviously become the center of managers' attention, the re is still a limited body of knowledge about 
what is CSR, how is CSR rele vant to corporations, and how does CSR fit into the way corporations conduct their 
businesses that eventually affect the fmn 's market value. This study attempts to make a contribution in understanding 
CSR as a corporate culture and how it affects the finn's value through earnings reporting. 
. Earnings reports are considered as one 	of the crucial pieces of information that fills the gap between managers and 
shareholders (Sloan 1996): Prior studies show that firms with persistent earnings are assigned a greater value in their 
securities (Kormendi and Lipe 1987, Collins and Kothari 1989, Ali and Zarowin 1992). Therefore, earnings persistence 
should reflect a higher quality of earnings. This study investigates the relationship between the fum' s CSR activities 
with its quality of earnings reporting and firm value. However, managers in a corporation have the opportunity to 
manage its earnings quality through accruals (Dechow et al. 1995). Furthermore, the accruals can be decomposed into 
discretionary accruals (DA) and nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) that measure the flex ible and non-flexible 
components of earnings management, respectively. Firms with higher NDA are considered to have better earnings 
reporting quality while those with higher DA are considered to have worse earnings reporting quality (Jones 1991 , 
Kothari et al. 2005, and McNichols 2002). As this study decomposes the accruals, it attempts to unveil the 
interrelationship between CSR, earnings r'eporting quality and firm value. 
Literature Review 
First, managers of corporation s need to have a better unde rstanding about how corporate social responsibility fits into 
their companies. Friedman (1970) defines CSR as follows : "Corporate social responsibility is to conduct the business in 
accord~nce with shareholders' desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to 
the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those e mbodied in ethical custom ." McWilliams and Siegel 
(200 1) defme CSR as actions that appear to further some social good beyond the firm's interests and that wh ich is 
required by law. Also in a recent study, Hill, Ainscough, and Manullang (2007) defme CSR as the economic, legal , 
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moral, and philanthropic actions of firms that influence the quality of life of relevant stakeholders. In summary, CSR 
entails business practices that maximize shareholders wealth but are still acceptable to non-investing stakeholders. 
While the definition of CSR seems to be straight forward, existing literature fmds an inconclusive relat ionship 
between CSR and fum value. This lack of evidence is critical to Frie dman ' s argument and creates skeptici sm regarding 
the actual value added properties of CSR (if any) in a corporation. Margolis and Walsh (2003) survey over 120 studies 
between 1971 and 2001 that examine the empirical relation between CSR and financial performance. They conclude _. 
that most results are largely inconclusive. They suggest that assessments of previous studies are complicated because of 
the studies' various imperfections, such as measurement problems related to CSR and financial performance, omitted 
variable problems, a lack of necessary analyses of causality and/or endogeneity, a lack of methodologi cal rigor, and a 
lack of theory. 
Recent studies on CSR and fum value are based on the principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Bamea 
and Rubin (20 1 0) examine the relation ship between fums' CSR ratings and their ownersh ip and capital structures and 
find that insiders tend to over-invest in CSR. However, insiders' ownership and leverage reduce this potential over­
investment. Fisman, Heal, and Nair (2008) examine the link between firms' CSR engagement and accounting profit. 
They fmd that the effect of CSR on profitability is stronger for ft.nns in more competitive industries. Managers utilize 
CSR as a product differentiation when their firms operate in a more competitive industry. Sherer, Palazzo, and 
Baumann, (2006) indicate tha t the role of a corporation in a soc iety is subject to discursive scrutiny by non -investing 
stakeholders (i.e., social or environmental activists) besides the shareholders. Managers use CSR activities as a conflict 
resolution between investing and non~ investing stakeholders. Prior, Surroca and Tribo (2008) fmd CSR as a moderating 
role for earnings management. Managers use CSR practices to disguise earnings management that carmot be sustained 
over time. 
Based on these recent studies, it seems that CSR is a result of a principal-agent problem where the manager is an 
agent who utilizes CSR as a tool to maximize their own private benefits (i.e. retention, compensation, conflict 
resolution, and earnings management) that may not necessarily increase shareholders' wealth. Therefore, the principal­
agent theory suggests that CSR is a product of managers ' self interest. However, the principal-agent theory does not 
allow the possibility that CSR is a fundamental corporate culture that might have been established within a corporation 
regardless of th e principal-agent problem. CSR represents the level of fmns (managers, owners, and employees) moral· 
and ethical beli ef that eventually manifests itself in the way they conduct their businesses. 
Contribution of the Study 
This study prese nts a theory of CSR that represents corporate culture within a corporation. If CSR represents 
corporate culture, then earnings management and firm value should be derived from the intensity or Jack of firm CSR 
activities. As the relationship between CSR and shareholders wealth is found unclear, the principal-agent theory (Jensen 
and Meckl ing, 1976) becomes one of the popular theories that explains why managers conduct CSR. However, it has 
some shortcomings. It fails to explain how corporate managers are able to fool shareholders, custom ers, suppliers and 
other stakeholders repetitively through CSR activities. More importantly, it does not allow the possibility that CSR may 
in fact be the fundamental factor that is engrained in the company on how to conduct its businesses such as corporate 
culture, ethics, beliefs, and social norms . Therefore, all other actions that the managers take to maximize the 
shareholders' wealth may in fact be a result of CSR. These following two diagram s illustrate the difference between the 
principal-agent theory and the corporate culture theory of CSR: 
Figure 1 shows that CSR is a result (moderator) of earnings reporting and fmn value that is infl uenced by earnings 
reporting. Prior et al. (2008) argues that fums with higher earnings management tend to conduct CSR. Barnea and 
Rubin (201 0) state that fums with plenty of resources (fum value) give managers opportunities to over-invest in CSR 
activities which eventually reduce the value of the fmn. All of these arguments are grounded on the basic premise of the 
principal-agent problem, where managers as agents may use CSR for their own self interests that are not necessarily 
maximizing shareholders' value. Figure 2 illustrates that CSR is the fundamenta l (antecedent) factor embedded in the 
firm cu lture that influences the way this fum reports its earnings and therefore its market value. · 
The CSR as a corporate culture argument is quite different from the principal -agent problem since CSR is assumed 
to be the antecedent of managers' earnings reporting style and fmn value. Based on the corporate culture theory, th is 
study performs two emp irical investigations using the Kinder, Lyndenberg and Domini (KLD) data for the regress ion 
analysis to address the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis I (HI): If the principal-agent theory is correct, then CSR represents a product of Earnings Quality (agency 
issue). However if CSR represents corporate culture, then CSR influences Earnin gs Reporting Quality instead of vice 
versa. 
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Hypothesis 2 (H2) : If CSR represents a finn 's Corporate Culture that influences Earnings Reporting, then CSR 
indirectly enhances Firm Value through Earnings Reporting. 
Figure 1: Corporate Social Responsibility as a Principal-Agent Problem 
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Figure 2: Corporate Social Responsibility as a Corporate Culture 
Sample, Data and Variables 
Corporate social respons ibility (CSR) is measured based on a composite score ofCSR strengths and concerns from 
the KLD Socrates database. This study utilizes KLD Socrates from 1991 to 2008. The following is a list of the strength 
items and concern items of the KLD lnclus ionary Social Ratings for the fo llowing five categories: Community, 
Diversity, Employee Relations, Environment, and Product Quality and Safety. 
The calculation of the combined strength and concern scores for each of the five categories are de fined below. 3 
COI\1MUNITY(i,t) = (sum of all community strength score for fmn i at year t minus the sum of all community concern 
score for finn i at year t plus total maximum possible number of community cDncern score at year t) divided by (total 
maxim um possible number of community strength score during year plus total maximum possible number of 
community concern score at year t) 
DIVERSITY(i,t) = (sum of all diversity strength score for finn i at year t minus the sum of all diversity concern score 
for ftrm i at year t plus total maximum possible number of diversity concern score at year t) divided by (total maximum 
possible number of diversity strength score during year plus total maximum possible number of diversity concern score 
at year t) 
EMPOYEE RELA TlONS(i,t) = (sum of all employee strength score for firm i at year t m inus the sum of all employee 
concern score for fmn i at year t plus total maximum possible number of employee concern score at year t) divided by 
(total maximum possible number of employee strength score during year plus total maximum possible number of 
employee concern score at year t) 
ENVlRONMENT(i,t) = (sum of all environment strength score for fmn i at year t minus the sum of all environment 
concern score for firm i at year t plus total maximum possible number of en vironment concern score at year t) di vided 
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by (total maximum possible number of environment· strength score during year plus total maximum possible number of 
environment concern score at year t) 
KLD Inclusionary Social Ratings 
Category Strength Items Concern Items 
Community Charitable Giving* Investment Controversies* 
lrmovative Giving* Negative Economic Impact* 
Non-U.S. Charitable Giving* Indigenous Peoples Relations ('00-'01) 
Support for Housing Tax D isputes* 
Support for Education (added '94) Other Concern 
Indigenous Peoples Relations (added '00, moved 
'02) 
Volunteer Programs (added in ' 05) 
Other Strength 
Diversity CEO Controversies* 
Promotion* Non-Representation 
Board of Directors Other Concern 
Work/Life Benefits 
Women & Minority Contracting* 
Employment of the Disabled* 
Gay.& Lesbian Policies* 
Other Strength 
Employee 

Relations 

Beneficial Products & Services 
Pollution Prevention* 
Recycling* 
Clean Energy* 
Communication s (added '96) * 
Property, Plant, and Equipment (ended '95) 
Management Systems (added ' 06)* 
Other Strength 
Poor Union Relations 
Health Safety Concern* 
Workforce Reductions 
. Pensio n/Benefits (added '92) 
Other Concern 
. -.:~ ~ . 
..1 _::~ ~~ 
Environment 
Union Relations 
No Layoff Policy (ended '94) 
Cash Profit Sharing* 
Employee Involvement* 
Retirement Benefits Strength 

Health and Safety Strength (added '03) 

Other Strength 

Hazardous Waste* 
Regulatory Problems* 
Ozone D epleting Chemicals 
Substantial Emissions 
Agricultural Chemicals 
Climate Change (added '99) 
Other Concern 
PRODUCT(i,t) = (sum of all product strength score for firm i at year t minus the sum of all product concern score for 
firm i at year t plus total maximum possible number of product concern score at year t) divided by (total maximum 
possible number of product strength score during year plus total maximum possible number of product concern score at 
year t)!! This study utilizes the data from KLD, Compustat and CRSP from 199 1 through 2008. Throughout this period, the 
KLD database expanded tlie number of firms from the S&P500 films to the Russe ll 2000 flrms and finn s in the Domini 
Social Index. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample used in this study. The sam ple contains 16,232 
firm s -years across 3,467 firms during 1991 to 2008. The mean of social meas ures, KLDIDX and DISClDX, are -0.0223 
I 
'I 
'1' 
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Product Quality* Prod uct Safety* 

Quality R&D/Innovation Marketing/Contracting Concern* 

and Safety Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged* Antitr.ust* 

Other Strength Other Concern 
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'
: 
. 
! 
and 0.010 I for the overall (full) sample. The mean of total accruals (ACCR), nondiscretionary accruals (NDA), and 
discretionary accruals (DA) are 0.98, 0.91 and 0.07, respectively, indicating that total accruals are primarily due to the 
nondiscretionary accruals component. Since nondiscretionary accruals is associated with higher earnings reporting 
quality and discretionary accruals is associated with lower earnings reporting quality, the sample indicates that on 
average, fums' accruals are dominated by higher qua)ity earnings reporting. The average fum size is $10.44 billion and 
its average age is 21.5 years indicating that the sample contains larger and older (well established) publicly traded fums. 
On average, the firm s have 22.75% fmancial leverage, 3.2% research and development expense, I .34% advertising 
expense, 13.78% sales growth and 3.33% return on assets. Again indicating well established and relatively low growth 
public fmns. A relatively low Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI) of 0.0016 indicates that these firms are operating in 
very competitive markets. Additionally, the firms have 9.7% volatility of monthly stock returns, 63% book to market 
ratio, 8.7% operating cash flow to total asset, 47.9% human capital, 1.28% capital expenditure to total asset, and 5.57% 
dividend to total equity ratio . These indicate larger, well established, stable, and capital intensive firms in the sample of 
this study. 
; The univariate t-tests for above and below the median of social rating disclosure measures show that firms with 
higher social disclosure ratings (DISCIDX) have less total accruals and discretionary accruals which indicate more !, 
sustainable earnings reporting. These fi.rms have lower leverage and book to market ratio which indicate higher market II value. The fums with higher disclosure also tend to be smaller, younger and operate in more competitive markets. The 
il last finding is consistent with the Fisman et al. (2006) study. 
ll Methodologyjj We use the following two measures ofCSR in our analysis: 
il 
1) KLDIDX = KLD composite social rating index; !I 2) DISCIDX =Disclosure rating index from a subset of all KLD inclusionary criteria. 
!i The Corporate Social Comb ined Score is calculated as follows : 
KLDIDX =(COMMUNITY+ DIVERSITY + EMPLOYEE + ENVIRONMENT+ PRODUCT)/5 
The Corporate Disc losure Score is calculated as follows: 
DISCIDX= similar to KLDIDX but only selected items of strengths and concerns from Community, Environment, 
Diversity, Employee, and Product indicated by * in the KLD Inclusionary Social Ratings table above. These items 
describe how the company discloses information to the public and its stakehoiders. 
We use discretionary accruals t o measure the magnirude of earnings management. We estimate discretionary 
accruals using an augmented modified Jones (1991) model that controls for performance (Kothari et al. 2005) and 
growth (McNichols 2002). We also follow Kothari et al. 's (2005) proposed alternative to the matched-firm approach by 
.{<·:i ~ 
I 
I 
. ~ including performance (return on assets) as an independent variable in the modified Jones (1991) model regression of 
Dechow et al. (1995). In addition, we also control for growth options (book-to-market ratio) in the modified Jones 
model regression because prior research suggests that fums with higher growth opportunities tend to have higher !I 
j accruals (e.g., McNichols 2002; Cohen eta!. 2005). 
:! 
'I 
I 
We defme discretionary accruals {DA) as: 
I DA, = ACCR, - NDA1 
Where ACCR is total accruals and NDA is nondiscretionary accruals. 
" 
Following previous studies (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995), ACCR is defmed as follows: 
ACCRt = (fl.CA, - fl.CL,- fl.Cash, + fl.STD,- Dep1)/(A,. 1) 
Where fl.CA is th e change in current assets (data 4), 
t.CL is the c hange in current liabilities (data 5), 

fl.Cash represents the change in cash and cash equivalents (data 1), 

t.STD is the change in debt included in current liabilities (data 34), and 
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Dep represents depreciation (data 14). 
To estimate nondiscretionary accruals, we use OLS regression (with no intercept) to first estimate the parameters of 
the following model: 
ACCR. = O.t(l iA1• 1) + a 2(6.REV/A,_t- Ll.REC/A1. 1) + a 3(PPE/ A,_t) + a.·4(ROA1) + a 5(BM1) + E1 
Where: 
A represents total assets (data 6), 

D.REV is the change in revenues (data 12), 

D.REC is the change in net receivables (data 2 minus data 67), 

PPE represents the amount of property, plant, and equipment (data 7), 

ROA is defined as the net income before extraordinary items (data 18) scaled by lagged total assets, and 

BM is the ratio of total assets to total assets minus book value of equity (data 60) plus market value of equity (the 

product of data 25 and data 199). 

Discretionary accruals are then estimated as: 
- ' DA, =ACCR, - NDA, 
Where: 
Th is study ultimately examines the impact of CSR on firm value through its accruals (both discretionary and 
nondiscretionary accruals). As a measure of fmn value, the srudy uses the Tobin' s Q ratio (Tobin 1969). Tobin's Q is 
widely used as a measure offmn value for example, Chung and Pruitt ( 1994) and Chung and Jo ( 1996), among others_ 
Following Chung and Pruitt (1994), Tobin's Q is calculated as: 
Tobin Q = {(Market value of common stock+ Book value of preferred stock + Book value of long-term debt+ 
Book value of current liabi lities - (Book value of current assets- Book value oflnventories)) I Book value of 
total assets} . 
We construct firm-specific control variables that Bowen et al. (1995) use t() proxy for th e extent of implicit 
claims between a firm and its shareholders. We use the fmn's own R&D and advertising intens ities, leverage, and 
human capital intensity. Similar to Hribar and Nichols (2007), we include fmn characteristics that have been identified 
by prior studies to be correlated with the absolute value ofdiscretionary accruals (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; 
Bowen et al. 2005). Skinner and Sloan (2002) fmd that growth fmns experience an asymmetrically large negative price 
response to negative earnings surprises. Therefore, the incentive to manage earnings is likely to be higher for growth 
firm s. Hribar and Nichols (2007) suggest that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is likely to be correlated with 
I 

ll 

!I 

il 
:t 
i! 
! 
measures of underlying operating volatility. Thus, we include the firm's volatility of cash flows, net income, and sales 
as addi tional controls. 
We defme our control variables as follows: 

Total Asset= Firm total assets (in millions); 

AGE= Number of years that a fmn is listed in Compustat database; 

Leverage= Long-term debt plus debt in current liability over total assets; 

RNDR =R&D expense over total assets; 

ADVR =Advertising expense over total assets; 

HHI ~ Hirschrnann-Herfindahl Index measure of firm's market concentration; 

. ROA =Net income over total assets; 
Stdevret = Standard deviation of monthly stock returns; 
BM = Book to market ratio of total assets over total liabilities plus market value of equity; 
Cash Flow = Operating cash flow over total assets; 
Salegrow =One year sales growth; 
HumanCap =Total assets minus gross property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets;. 
CAPXR = Capital expenditures over total assets; 
DIVR =Total dividend divided by book value of total equity 
To perform the causality test for CSR, we estimate the following regressions: 
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 KLDIDX 
., : ' } ! 
. ' ~. DISCIDX 
Lil 
.,.I' ACCR
,I ·~·.;il 
i NDA : ~ 
:,.i: DA 
.. 
Total Asset 
. 
..
' 
' ~ 
· :' AGE ~ l ...,, 
Leverage 
f. RNDR!l ., 
•.")
' I 
• \ ADVR! 
; 
' 
'_i HHJ' 
...i
. ROA
· j 
Stdevret 
::j 
•! BM 
'! 
Cash Flow 
J Salegrow (%)s 
·' 
'• 
!
\, 
f. HumanCap 
) CAPXR (%)
.. ~ ' ~·~ DJVRf 
Below Median 
All Sample DISCJDX 
-0.0223 -0. 1230 
0.010 1 -0.1149 
0.9856 1.0144 
0.9 116 0.9225 
0.0740 0.0919 
10440.14 11772.78 
21.5099 21.9323 
0.2275 0.2438 
0.0320 0.0291 
0.0 134 0.0119 
0.0016 0.00 19 
0.0333 0 .03 12 
0.0974 0.0967 
0.63 56 0.6492 
0.0876 0.0851 
13.7801 13.53 12 
0.4798 0.4695 
1.2772 1.5766 
0.0557 0 .0471 
Above Median 
DISClDX t-stats 
0.1594 I0.02** 
0.2356 13.02** 
0.9336 7.91 ** 
0.8920 4.86** 
0.041 6 5.62** 
8036.134 4.40** 
20.7478 4.75** 
0.1982 13.22** 
0.0373 6.87** 
0.0162 6.76** 
0.0011 2. 12* 
0.0369 2.51 ** 
0.0988 2.29* 
0.61 11 9.06** 
0.0920 3.67** 
14.2291 1.42 
0.4775 1.18 
1.2163 1.09 
0.0711 1.16 
:!t Sample Size 16232 8116 8116 
~~ #Firms 3467 2865 2806 
·i 
j 
KLDIDX = a+ ~~(lagKLDIDX) + ~2(lagACCR or lagNDA or lagDA) + y(Control Variables)+ € 
DISCIDX =a+ ~1 (lagDISCIDX) + ~2(1agACCR or lagNDA or lagDA) + y(Control Variables)+£ 
To perform the causiility test for the accrual measures , we estimate the following regressions: 
ACCR =a + ~ 1 (1agACCR) + ~2(lag KLDIDX or lag DISCIDX) + y(Control Variables)+£ 
NDA =a+ ~1 ( 1 agNDA) + ~2(lag KLDIDX or lag DISC!DX) + y(Control Variables) +£ 
DA =a+ P1(lagDA) + Pilag KLDIDX or lag DISCIDX) + y(Control Variables) + £ 
To analyze accruals and frrm performance, we estimate the following regression equations for each measure of 
CSR (KLDIDX and D!SCfDX) below the median and above the median. 
TOBTNQ =a+ P1ACCR + y(Control Variables) +£ 
TOBJNQ"' a+ P1NDA + -y(Control Variables)+£ 
TOBTNQ = a+ P1DA + -y(Control Variables)+ £ · 
We also perfonn a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation to alleviate endogeneity concerns arising from the 
potentially simultaneous relation between earnings reporting (ACCR, NDA, and DA), CSR (KLDIDX and DISC IDX) 
and fum value (Tobin Q). Earnings reporting and CSR are treated as endogeneous variables . 
Results 
First, this study tests the causality between earnings reporting (in terms of accruals) and social ratings (KLDIDX 
and DISCJDX) to gain a better understanding of whether accruals reporting drive CSR activities or vice versa. Table 2 
journal of Current Research in Global Business Vol ume 13 Number 20 Fall 2010 Page 7I ~ 
I 
; 
! 
. 
i 
; 
; 
~ 
~ 
I 
. 
! 
~ 
i 
Table 2: Causality Test for CSR 
Dep endent KLDIDX KLDIDX KLDIDX DISCIDX DISCIDX DISCIDX 
Variable (Y.) (Yt) (Y,) (Yt) (Y,) (Y.) 
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.4801 0.48 13 0.4846 0.4698 0.4720 0.4746 
(Y•. ,) (69.58)** (68.26)** (67.83)** (64.53)** (63.41)** (62.98)** 
fl lagACCR -0.0012 0.0001 
(0.46) (0.03) il JagND A -0.0187 -0.0210I 
i 
I (0.59) (0.57) 
! ' 
lagDA 0.0249 0.0043 
(1.72) (0.25) 
Total Asset (log) -0.0123 -0.0137 -0.0140 -0.0 196 -0 .0220 -0.0228 
(3.72)** ( 4.1 0)* * (4.16)** (5.11)** (5.68)** (5.80)** 
AGE 0.0001 0.00003 0 .0001 0.0003 0.0001 0 .0001 
(0.27) (0.04) (0.12) (0.59) (0.29) (0.28) 
Leverage 0.0045 0.0023 0.0035 0.0121 0.0085 0.0 12 1 
(0.42) (0.21) (0.32) (0.96) (0.67) (0.95) 
RNDR. -0.0085 -0.0272 -0.0285 -0 .0710 -0.0913 -0.0927 
(0 .21) (0.64) (0.67) (1 .48) (1 .85) (1.89) 
ADVR 0.0156 0.0154 0 .0276 -0.0260 -0.0226 -0.0086 
(0.25) (0.24) (0.44) (0.36) (0.31) (0.12) 
HHI -0.8275 -0.2793 -0.2869 -0.5950 -0.4737 -0.4902 
i I (4.90)** ( 1.29) (1.3 3) (3 .03)* * (1.88) (1.96)II · ROA 0 .0460 0 .0459 0.0461 0.0196 0.02 15 0 .023 1 
iI (4.21)** (4.25)** (4.28)** (1.54). ( 1.7 1) ( 1.84) 
:I Stdevret -0.0458 -0.0457 -0.0442 0.0240 0.0237 0 .0238
' 
I 
(1.74) (1.69) (1 .63) (0.79) (0.75) (0.75)1\ 

! I 
I Intercept 0.0835 0 .0927 0.0942 0.1708 0.1900 0 .1919 

II {3.39)** (3.78)** p .802** {5.94}** {6.63)** (6.64}** 
:I 

!II Absolute value oft-statistics in parentheses. Dummy variables for years are not reported to conseJ\Ie space. 
•I * significant at 5%; ** significant at I%. 
:I 
: I 
I 
presents the Granger causality test to determine whether earnings reporting (ACCR, NDA and DA) affects CSR 
(KLDIDX or DISCIDX) using a panel data fixed effects regression. The results indicate that all the lagged accruals 
reporting variables (lagACCR, lagNDA and JagDA) do not affect fi rm CSR activit ies . Therefore, there is no empirical 
evidence to· support that accruals reporting drives CSR activities. The study also uses two and three years of lagged!l accruals reporting (results are not 'repon:ed in the tables) and st ill do not find any empirical evidence to support that I accruals drive CSR activities. This study does not find evidence that managers use CSR activities to disguise
I shareholders from their earnings window dressing through accruals as was found in the Prior et al. (2008) study.
!I
, I 
I
I journal of Current Research in Global Business Volume 13 Number 20 Fall2010 Page 8 
! 
! 
i 
Sample s ize 17714 16883 165 17 17714 16883 16517 
#Firms 3738 3549 3498 3738 3549 3498 
R-sguared 0.2756 0.2761 0.2792 0.2576 0.2608 0.2626 
i 
I! 
!I ~ ~ 
:I 
'! 
;. 
If 
iJ 
Table 3: Causality Test for Accrual Measures 
ACCR NDA DA ACCR NDA DA 
(Yt) (Yt) (Yt) (Yr) (Y,) (Yr) 
Lagged Dep. Yar . -0.0269 -0.0123 -0. 1746 -0.0262 -0.0124 -0. 1746 
(Y,.J) (3.57)* * (1.59) (22.07)** (3.47)** ( 1.61) (22.07)** 
lagKLDIDX -0.0990 0.0003 -0.0996 
(4.88)** (0.11) (2.42)* 
lagDISCIDX -0.0724 0.0015 -0.0737 
(3.94)** (0.92) (3.51)** 
Total Asset (log) -0.3403 -0.0036 0.0042 -0.3403 -0.0036 0.0043 
(34.27)** (4 .32)** (2 .31 )* (34.25)** (4.28)** (2.32)* 
AGE -0 0006 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.56) (0.3'8) (0 .22) (0.53) (0.37) (0 .22) 
Leverage 0 .8195 -0.0033 0.0417 0 .8196 -0.0033 0 .0417 
(25.58)** (1.21) (7 .02)** (25.57)** ( 1.21) (7.02)** 
RNDR 1.7249 0 .0328 -0. 1330 1.7268 0 .0329 -0.1330 
(13 .85)* * (3.04)** (s-:68)** (13.86)** (3 .05)** (5.68)** 
ADVR 1.1772 -0.0364 0 .0445 1.1825 -0.0363 0 .0445 
(6.49)* * (2.37)* (1.33) (6.52)** (2 .36)* (1 .33) 
HumanCap -0.0003 0 .0047 -0.0145 0 .0016 0 .0047 -0.0145 
(0.01) (1 .19) (1.69) (0.04) (1.19) (1.69) 
BM 0.1091 -0.0042 -0.0382 0.1120 -0.0042 -0.0383 
(4.62)** (2.1 0)* (8.72)** (4.75)** (2.1 0)* (8.73)** 
ROA -0.4081 0.0510 0 .0908 -0.4074 0.0510 0 .0908 
(12.38)** (18.54) ** (15 .22)** (12.36)** (18.55)** (15.22)** 
Cash Flow -0.0678 -0.0244 -0.4087 -0.0685 -0.0244 -0.4087 
( 1.34) (5.65)** (43 .29)* * (1.3 5) (5 .64)** (43 .28)** 
Salegrow -0.0026 0 .0002 0 .0000 -0.0026 0.0002 0.0000 
(24.12)** (17 .93)** (2 .35)* (24.06)** (17 .90)** (2.34)* 
-Stdevret 0.1305 -0.0028 -0.0737 0. 1322 -0.0026 -0.0737 
(1 .69) (0.42) (5.10)** (1.7 1) (0.40) (5.10)** 
Intercept 3.7011 -0.0024 0 .0373 3.6986 . -0.0027 0.0372 
~40.822** {0.39) {2.26)* {40.77)** (0.44) (2 .25) * 
Sample size 16361 16234 15937 16361 16234 15937 
#Firms 3475 3446 3388 3475 3446 3388 
R-sguared 0.2724 0 .1220 0.1839 0.2719 0. 1220 0 .1839 
Absolute value oft-stat istics in parentheses. Dummy variables for years are not reported to conserve space. 
* Significant at 5%; H significant at 1%. 
Table 3 shows the regression results to test the causality of whether CSR acti vities drive the firms' accruals 
- reporting. We find strong evidence that lagged social ratings (JagKLDIDX and lagDISCIDX) significantly reduce 
firms' total accruals (ACCR) and more importantly discretionary accruals (DA). Nondiscretionary accruals are 
associat~d wi th higher earni.ngs reporting quality while discretionary accruals are associated with lower earnings 
reporting q\,lality. Therefore, this finding demonstrates that fmns with higher CSR activities tend to have lower 
accruals, especially discretionary accruals, which imply better quality of earnings repo rting. 
A one percent increase in social rating, measured by KLDIDX, reduces total and discretionary accruals by 9 .9% 
and 9.96%, respectively. A one percent increase in social rating, measured by DISCIDX, r educes total and discre­
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T a ble 4: Accrua ls and Firm Performance 
Panel A: KLDIDX 
Below . Above Below Above Below Above 
Median Median Median Median Median Median 
KLDIDX KLDIDX KLDJDX KL DIDX KLDIDX KLDIDX 
TOBINQ TOBfNQ TOBTNQ TOBfNQ T OBINQ TOBINQ 
ACCR 0 .5998 . 0.6055 
(2.60 )** (2.89)** 
NDA 0.9935 1.9436 
(3.80)** (3. 22)** 
DA -0.1163 -0 .404 5 
(2.04)* (1.84) 
Total Asset 
(log) -0.4720 -0.8235 -0.4332 -0 .72 18 -0.4364 -0.740 1 
(16.59)** (17 .05)* * (15 .91)** (15.43)** (16.0 1)** ( 15 .89)** 
AGE -0.0025 0.00 16 -0.0023 -0 .0002 -0 .0024 0.0007 
(0.96) (0. 19) (0.88) (0.02) (0.91) (0 .08) 
Leverage -0.6647 - 1.1945 -0.7502 -1.4177 -0.7716 -1.4409 
(8. 15)** (6 .82)** (9.55)* * (8.22)** (9.75)** (8.33)** 
RNDR 2.5907 4 .0960 2.3693 J .6533 2.3476 3 .6465 
(7. 78)** (7 .16)** (7 .2 1 )** (6.4 1) ** (7 .14)** (6.39)** 
ADVR -1.1468 0 .7639 -1.3463 0 .5674 -1.3741 0.4557 
(1.73) (1.0 8) (2.04)* (0 .80) (2.08)* (0 .64) 
CAPXR 0 .0002 -0.0028 0 .0002 0.0038 0.0002 0.0063 
(0.95) (0.08) (0.84) (0. 12) (0.87) (0 .19) 
HHI -1 .5606 -0.0302 -1.4 723 -0.2720 -1 .6243 -0 .3820 
(0.68) (0 .01) (0.64) (0 . I 3) (0.71) (0. 19) 
Salegrow 0 .0025 0.0044 0.0026 0.0049 0 .0028 0.0053 
(9. 17) ** (7.20)** (9.59)** (8.26)** ( 1 0.37) * * (8.93 )** 
DIVR 0.0058 0 .0 137 0.0056 0.0135 0.0 055 0.0 140 
(0.58) (2.07)* (0 .57) (2.02)* (0. 55) (2 .1 0)* 
Stdevret 0.35 47 0.1 188 0.3432 0 .0178 0.3382 -0 .0 126 
(1 .77) (0.28) ( 1.71 ) (0.04) (1.68) (0 .03) 
Intercept 5.2810 8.264 1 4.9934 7.4247 4.9902 7.5014 
(25.65)** (21.94)** (25.69)** (20 .78)** (25.64)** . (20.98)** 
Sample Size 811 6 8 116 8 116 8 11 6 8116 811 6 
#Finns 3000 2990 3000 2990 3000 2990 
R-squared 0.1407 0.2019 0.1 402 0.1955 0.1388 0. I 939 
Absolute value of !-statistics in parentheses. Dummy variables for years are not reported to conserve space. 
* signifi cant at 5%; ** significant at I%. 
tionary accruals by 7.24% and 7.37%, respect ively. Inte restingly, both soc ial rating index meas ure s do not 
significantly affect the nondiscretionary accrual (NDA). Rath~r, NDA is more in fl ue nced by firms ' specific 
characteristics such as size, R&D , advertising expenses, R OA, sales growth, etc . Overall results from Tables 2 and 3 
provide an answer for our firs t hypothesis (HI ) . We reject the principal-agen t theory and find that CSR drives the 
quality ofearnings reporti ng rather tha n earn ings re porting drives the CSR activi ties. 
Afte r establishing causality, the study examines the impact of accruals on fum val ue (measured-by Tobin's Q) . 
The srudy breaks down the full samp le in to two subsamp les of tinns that have social index (KLDIDX and 
DISCIDX) bel ow the median of social index and those a bove the median. The main purpose of this analysis is to 
examine the i mpact of CSR on fmn value through accruals reporting. 
Table 4 presents the fixed e ffects pane l data regression results. Both social indexes indicate that total accruals 
pos it ively affect fum value and the effect of total accrua ls on fum va lue is larger for fmns with above median CSR 
index. Thi s e vidence is even mo re pronounc ed for th e nondiscret ionary ac cruals. On the oth er ha nd, the 
discretionary accruals red uce ftrm value, especially for those fmns w ith above median CSR index. The last find ing 
is actually consistent with the Prior et a l. (2008) fmding which indicates that the negative impact of discretionary 
accruals on fmn val ue is even worse for firms that have higher CSR activities. These firm s .use the CSR activities to 
cover up the ir lower qua lity of earn ings reporting. 
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Table 4 (continued): Accruals and Firm Performance 

Panel B : DISCIDX 

Below Above Below Above · Below Above 
Median Median Median Median Median Median 
DISCIDX DISCIDX DISCIDX DISCIDX DISCIDX DISCIDX 
; · 
;. : c k 
.. 
. ·r.. ~ Y.  
, . : 
TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ 
ACCR 0.3360 0.5832 
(2.95)** (6.44)** 
' NDA 1.2182 1.5204 
(4.49)** (8.80)** !I 
DA -0.1265 -0.4278 ,I 
(2.98)** (2.13)* 
Tot~l .Asset 
(log) -0.4972 -0. 7848 -0.4695 -0.6828 -0.4742 -0.6964 
(17.31)** (16.41)** (17 .08)** (14.81)** ( 17 .23)** (15.16)** 
AGE -0.0020 -0.0032 -0.0019 -0.0046 -0.0020 -0.0044 
(0.76) (0.39) (0.71) (0.55) (0.73) (0.52) 
Leverage 
-0.6599 
(7. 72)* * 
-1.3085 
(7 .88)* * 
-0.7113 
(8.63 )** 
-1.5018 
(9.16)** 
-0.7360 
(8.86)** 
-1 .52 85 
(9 .30)** 'I 
RNDR 2.2779 4.1689 2.1351 3.6872 2.1131 3.6455 
(6.37)** (7.89)** (6 .05)** (7.03)** (5.98)** (6 .95) * * 
ADVR 
-1.0490 0.6268 -1.1400 0.3894 -1.1669 0.2833 
(1.89) (0.77) (2.06)* (0 .48) (2 .11)* (0.35) 
CAPXR 0.0004 -0.0129 0.0002 -0.0076 0.0003 -0.0068 
(0.45) (0.84) (0.28) (0.49) (0.35) (0.44) 
HHI -1.2415 -0.4214 -1 .1086 -0.6757 -1.2779 -0.7727 
(0.56) (0.21) (0.50) (0.33) (0.58) (0.38) 
Salegrow 0.0025 0.0041 0.0025 0.0046 0.0027 0.0048 
(8.51)** (7.81)** (8 .64)** (8.74)** (9.41)** (9.42)** 
DIVR 0.0062 0.0139 0.0062 0.0139 0.0059 0.0144 
(0.62) (2.14)* (0.62) (2.13)* (0.59) (2.21 )* 
Stdevret 0.1268 0.5514 0. 1335 0.4317 0.1163 0.4476 
(0.61) (1.46) (0.64) ( 1.14) (0.56) ( l.l8) 
Intercept 5.3456 7.9016 5.0925 6.8787 5.0988 6.9269 
(20.70)** (16.96)** (21.01)** (15 .57)** (20.99)** (15 .68)** 
SampleSize 8116 8116 8116 8116 8116 8116 
# Firms 2865 2806 2865 2806 2865 2806 
R-squared 0.1366 0.2006 0. 1380 0.1938 0.1358 0. 1931 
Absolute value oft-statistics in parentheses. Dummy variables fo r years are not reported to conserve space. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Based on empirical evidence from the causality test, accrual measures are endogenously determined by CSR 
activities. Therefore, it calls for a simultaneous equation to properly examine the impact of accruals on firm value. 
Table 5 shows the two-stage least square (2SLS) results for accruals and firm value. Both social indexes indicate 
that CSR activities increase the fum ' s nondiscretionary accruals but reduce its discretionary accruals. This reaffirms 
the earlier finding from Table 3 that CSR actlvities enhance the firm's earnings reporting quality. 
The impact of all accrual measures on firm value in the 2SLS regression is also consistent with the findings in 
Table 4. Nondiscretionary accruals increase fum value while discretionary accruals reduce fi.rm value. Total 
. accruals still positively affect fmn value because most of the total accruals results are driven from nondiscretionary 
accruals. Overaii, the 2SLS ·regression results provide an answer to our second hypothesis (H2). Tables 4 and 5 
consistently show that CSR activities indirectly, but positively, influe nce fum value since CSR activities increase 
the qualli:y of earnings reporting from nondiscretionary accruals. The same control variables in Tables 3 and 4 are 
used in this 2SLS regression and the estimated slope coefficients for control variables are not reported to conserve 
space. 
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Conclusion 
This study attempts to test two theories on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) that explain the relationship 
:· ., ... 
between CSR and fmn value. CSR can be viewed as a principal-agent problem versus CSR as a corporate culture. •.: -~ 
1 ".ln other words, is CSR a result of managers' self interest to spend the firm 's resources on CSR for their own benefit 
.
· , 
. ? :\• .­
and therefore negatively (or insignificantly) affect flilTI value or does CSR represent corporate culture that pos iti_yely 
influences earnings reporting quality and ther efore enhances fmn va lue? This study finds supporting evidence that 
CSR represents a fmn 's corporate culture which positively enhances earnings reporting quality instead of earnings ~ I 
reporting influencing CSR activ ities as predicted by the principal-agency theory. The results indicate that firm s with ;: 
I 
higher CSR activities have higher nondiscretionary accruals and have lower d iscretionary accruals which enhance 
earnings reporting quality. More importantly, this study finds that through higher nondiscretionary accruals and 
lower discretionary accruals (which implies better earnings reporting quality), CSR indirectly, but positively, affects 
firm value. 
Table 5: Accruals and Firm Performance from Simultaneo us Equ ations (2SLS) 
Panel A: LagKLDlDX 
TOBTNQ ACCR TOBINQ NDA TOBINQ DA 
LagKLDIDX 0.0035 
(1.45) 
0.0 045 
(3.76)** 
-0.003 7 
(2.60)** 
ACCR 0.1642 
li 
(2 .26)*"' 
LagACCR 
NDA 
0.1640 
(25.7 8)** 
0.7324 
(5.55)** 
LagNDA 0.4030 
(74.83)** 
DA -0.4576 
(2. 1 0)* 
LagDA 0.0593 
(8.70)** 
Intercept 2.7023 
(4.80)** 
Observations 15970 
0.0194 
{5 .34}* * 
15970 
2.636 1 
{4.542* * 
16090 
-0.0 137 
(7.6 1)** 
16090 
2 .7317 
{4 .1 62* * 
15804 
0.0418 
(8. 152*"' 
15804 
R-sguared 0.1579 0.2259 0.1588 0.3624 0.1658 0.1228 
Panel B : LagDISCIDX 
!I 
l
' I 
LagDISCIDX 
ACCR 0. 1650 
(2. 18)* * 
LagACCR 
NDA 
TOBfNQ 
0.0034 
(1.41) 
0.1640 
(25.78)** 
ACCR 
0.7593' 
TOBINQ 
0.0039 
(3.37)** 
NDA TOBINQ 
-0.0023 
(2 .93)** 
DA 
(4.60)** 
LagNDA 
DA 
0.4033 
(74 .90)** 
-0.4664 
LagDA 
(2.31)* 
0.0594 
(8.71)** 
Intercept 2.7023 
(2 .8 0}** 
Observations 15970 
R-sguared 0.1579 
0.0 188 
(5 .122** 
15970 
0.2259 
2.6359 
{4.53)** 
16090 
0.1587 
-0.0 144 
(7.932** 
16090 
0.3623 
2.7314 
(4 .16)** 
15804 
0.1657 
0.0422 
(9.232** 
15804 
0.1227 
. ~: ," 
... 
.:.i 
Absolute value of !-statistics in parentheses. Dummy variables for years are not reported to conserve space. 
• significant at 5%; ,.. significant at I% 
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Corporate culture theory offers a different explanation about the relationship between CSR, earnings reporting 
and firm value from the existmg t~eory of the principal-agent problem. However, this study does not dismiss the 
possibility that CSR may in fact be a result of a principal-agent theory in another spectrum of a corporation such as 
corporate governance, corporate donations, and other social and financial activities (Barnea and Rubin 2010). 
Also, this study fmds supporting evidence that for fmns with CSR activities higher than the median, the 
negative impact of discretionary accruals on firm value is heightened . This implies that fmns with lower earnings 
reporting quality, measured by discretionary accrual s, may use CSR to d elude shareholders from their lower 
earnings reporting quality (Prior et al. 2008). 
Notes 
1. 	 Further d etails on the defmition of each indicator are available from KLD Research & Analytics, Inc at . 
http://www.kld.com/research/rat1ngs_indicators.html. 
2. 	 Source: The Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini' s (KlD) Stats database. 
References 
Ali, A. and Zarowin, P .. "Pennanent versus transito ry components of' armual earnings and estimation error in 

earnings response coefficients," Journal ofAccounting and Econornics, 15, 1992, pp. 249-265. 

' ' ) Bamea, A., and Rubin A., "Corporate social respons ibility as a conflict between shareholders," Journal ofBusiness 
( 
.. 
.'J Ethics, forthcoming 2010.
,' 
. )~~ 

: - ·;-.; 
 Bergstresser, D ., and Philippon, T . "CEO incentives and earnings management," Journal ofFinancial Economics, 
80 (June), 2006, pp. 511-529 . 
Bowen, R., L. DuCharme, and Shores D., "Stakeholders implicit claims and accounting method choice," Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 20 (December), 1995, pp. 255-295. 
Bowen, R. , S. Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam M. , "Accounting discretion, corporate governance, and firm 
perfonnance," Working paper, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 2005. 
Chung, K., and Jo H ., "The impact of security analysts' monitoring and marketing functions on the market value of 
firms," Journal ofFinancial and Quantitative Analysis, 31, 1996, pp. 493-512. 

Chung, K. and Pruitt S .A. , " A simple approximation ofTobin 's q ," FinanCial Management, 23, 1994, pp. 70-74. 

Cohen, D. A., A. Dey, and T. Lys Z., "Trends in earnings management and infonnativeness of earnings 

announcements in the pre- and post-Sarbanes Oxley periods," Working paper, Northwestern Uni versity , 

Chicago, IL, 2005. 

Collins, D. W . and Kothari S. P ., "An analysis of intertemporal and cross-sectional determinants of earnings 

response coefficients," Journal ofAccounting and Economics, II , 1989, pp. 143-182. 

Dechow, P ., R. Sloan, and Sweeney A.. , "Detecting earnings management," The Accounting Review, 70, 1995, 

pp. 193-225. 

Fisman, R., G . Heal, and Nair V ., " A model of corporate philanthropy," Working paper, Wharton School, 

University of Pennsylvania, 2008. 

Friedman, M ., "Money and income: comment on Tobin," Quarterly J ournal ofEconom ics, 84, 1970, pp. 318-327. 

Hill , R. P., T. Ainscough, T. Shank, and Manullang D., "Corporate social responsibility and socially responsible 

investing: A global perspective," Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 70, 2007, pp. 165-174. 

Hribar, P. , and Nichols D. C., "The use of unsigned earnings quality measures in tests of earnings management," 

Journal ofAccounting Research, 45 (December), 2007, pp. 1017-1053. 

· Jensen, M. C. and Meckling W ., "Theory of firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure," Jo urnal 

ofFinancial Economics, 3, 1976, pp . 305-360. 

Jones, J., "Earnings management during import re lief investigations," Journal ofAccounting Research, 29 

(Autumn), 1991 , pp. 193-228. 

Konnendi, R. and Lipe R. , "Earnings innovations, earnings persistence, and stock returns," Th e Journal of Business, 

·''··; 60, 1987, pp.323-345 . 

K othari , S. P., A. J. Leone, and Wasley C. E., " Performance matched discretionary accrual measures," Journal of 

Accounting and Economics, 39 (February), 2005, pp. 163-197. 

Margolis, J. D ., and Walsh J . P ., "Misery loves companies: rethinking social initiatives by business," Administrative 

Science Quarterly, 48, 2003, pp. 268-305. 

•..::... McNichols, M . F., "Discussion of the quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors," The 

Accounting Review, 77 (Supplement), 2002, pp. 61-69. 

McWilliams, A., and Siegel D., "Corporate social responsibility and firm financial perfonnance: correlation or 

misspecification?" Strategic Management Journal, 2 1, 200 l , pp. 603 -609. 

journal of Current Research in Global Business Volume 13 Number 20 Fall 2010 Page 13 
i 
o 
; 
'
 
 
l'r ~ 
. '
I 
I 
l I 
l 
. ; __
-:..; 
. ·:.. ..... 
,, ·( 
' r 
,', : 
!: . 
i
•
Prior, D., J. Surroca, Tribo and J. A. , "Are socially responsible managers really ethical? Exploring the relationship 
between earnings management and corporate social respons ibility," Corporate Governance: international 
Review, 16 (3), 2008, pp. 160-1 77. 
Scherer, A., G. Palazzo, and Baumann D. , "Global rules and private actors, Toward a new role of the TNC in global 
governance," Business Ethics Quarterly, 16, 2006, pp. 502-532. 
Skinner, D . J., and Sloan R. G., "Earnings s urprises, growth expectations, an d stock returns: Don't let an earnings 
sink your portfolio," Review ofAccounting Studies, 7 (June), 2002, pp. 289-312. 
Sloan, R., "Do stock prices fully reflect information in accrual s and cash flows about fut ure earnings?" The 
Accounting Review, 71, 1996, pp. 289-315. 
Tobin J., "A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory" , Journal ofMoney Credit and Banking, 1 (1), 1969, 
pp. 15-29 
l
, l r'- , 
-~ .. ; 
!I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
Journal of Current Research in Global Business Volume 13 Number 20 Fall 2010 Page 1 4 
